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THE SOMETIMES UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL PRACTICE THROUGHOUT
HISTORY
THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH. Steven G.
Calabresi 1 and Christopher S. Yoo.c New Haven: Yale
University Press. 2008. Pp. xiii +544. $60.00.
Harold J. Krent'

Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo's book The Unitary
Executive presents an excellent inquiry into the concept of a centralized executive throughout our history. The authors' goal is to
persuade the reader that all presidents have viewed the power to
supervise and remove subordinates as central to the very meaning of "executive power" in Article II of the Constitution. Without such an ability, presidents would be unable to execute the
law effectively and place their stamp on the administration. The
authors succeed in attaining that goaL for the record they portray reveals a long tradition of forceful assertion of presidential
rights to control policy through close supervision of officers
within the executive branch.
In assessing the history. the authors focus on ''the president's constitutional power to remove and direct subordinates,
including those in entities like the Treasury Department, the
Post Office, federal prosecutors. and the independent agencies
that some have said are beyond presidential powers of control"
(p. 418). All forty-three presidents (prior to the current Administration) have embraced a conception of the unitary executive
that at least encompasses the powers to remove and supervise
their subordinates' exercise of delegated authority so as to create
one centralized executive branch. Moreover. an unbroken hisI. Professor of Law. Northwestern Universitv.
2. Professor of Law and Communication. Un"iversitv of Pennsvlvania Law School.
3. Dean and Professor. liT Chicago-Kent Colleg~ of Law. i thank Tom Merrill
and Mark Rosen for commenting on an earlier draft.
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torical practice, in their view, lends considerable force to the
contemporary question of whether the unitary executive ideal is
4
grounded in the Constitution. Their normative view embraces
the unitary executive concept, and they accordingly critique current doctrine, in particular, the Supreme Court's decision in
Morrison v. Olson,' for permitting Congress to limit the executive's removal authority over agency officials (pp. 377-78). To
them, the existence of independent agencies cannot be squared
with the historical recognition of the importance of the president's removal authority."
Had the authors only addressed the removal authority, 7
their argument would have been convincing. But the authors
claim to be addressing the entire panoply of authorities that can
be traced to the unitary executive. The authors never delineate
which powers-other than the appointment and removal authorities-are critical to the unitary executive ideal." Thus, it is difficult, at times, to ascertain whether the authors present a historical incident to further their thesis that presidents have
consistently asserted a particular power, like the removal authority. or rather merely to applaud a president's actions.
For example, the authors write of President Lincoln's unilateral efforts to prepare the Union for war (pp. 165-69), but it is
not clear why. A presidential power to act outside of congressional will, which they at times criticize (pp. 174-78), seems far
from falling within a unitary ideal. Moreover, they describe at
length the Supreme Court decision in In re Neagle," which af4. P. 4 ("[A] foundational principle of law is that to some degree what the law is
on the books is determined by what it actually is in practice."). Similarly. to the extent
that Congress or the courts consistently claim a particular view. that evidence should be
relevant as well to the ultimate meaning of a constitutional provision. whether in Article
I. II. or Ill. The authors suggest that the views of the coordinate branches have not been
as consistent as those of the executive branch. (pp. 16. 28).
5. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
6. In making their case. the authors only touch tangentially on a wide panoply of
other presidential powers. whether the pardon power or the power to serve as Commander-in-Chief. Their book. therefore. does not explore some of the most controversial
exercises of presidential power during President George W. Bush's Administration-the
sanction of torture. the spying on U.S. citizens. and the incarceration of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bav.
7. The authors la;gely rely only on the removal authority. Longstanding criticism
by presidents as to congressional efforts to limit the appointment authority would have
bolstered their thesis. See HAROLD J. KRENT. PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 24-36 (2005).
8. In the conclusion. the authors summarize their findings by category such as "independent counsels." "the civil service." "independent agencies." and so forth (pp. 41728). They do not specify. however. which attributes of the unitary executive have been
consistently adhered to by presidents throughout history.
9. 135 u.s. 1 (1890).
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firmed a realm of inherent presidential power in sustaining an
executive branch decision-in the absence of congressional authorization- to detail a marshal to protect the life of a threat10
ened Supreme Court Justice (pp. 221-24). There is a conceivable but by no means ineluctable connection between that
11
decision and the unilateral executive. Similarly, the authors
commend presidents who have asserted the power to construe
the constitution for themselves, but do not explain why that authority fits within their conception of the unitary executive (pp.
69-71, 80, 98). 12 The exercise of the veto power, which the authors discuss at several points, seems even more tangential (pp.
95, 99, 135-36, 153, 385). The book suffers from lack of a taxonomy of powers linked to the unitary executive conception: a
strong executive is not necessarily a unitary one.
The unitary executive ideal as traditionally understood focuses not on the relationship between the president and the
coordinate branches but more narrowly on the relationship between the president and subordinates within the executive
branch. That is why the appointment and removal authorities are
so key under this "superintendence" theory. In the absence of
such authorities. Congress could delegate key functions to independent presidential subordinates so as to preclude effective
centralized control of executive authority by a president. The
power of a president to disagree with the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations or to act in the absence of congressional authorization is beside the point. The historical evidence

10. They add that "[i]t is inconceivable that an administration that endorsed [Attorney General] Miller's Lincolnian interpretation of Article II would not also believe
that the president had the authority to control subordinate executive officials in their execution of federal law" (p. 223). The authors simply do not make the case that all who
believe that the president has inherent authority to act to protect the nation. in the absence of a statute to the contrary. must believe in the power to dismiss subordinates at
wilL much less to nullify any actions taken pursuant to congressional direction.
11. Presumably. if presidents can act in the absence of legislation to pursue measures protecting the public welfare. they can ignore congressional limits on the presidential removal authority or congressional specification that particular executive branch officials (as opposed to the president) are to make certain decisions. But. the connection is
indirect. In any event. the authors dismiss Supreme Court decisions with which they disagree. such as Humphrey's Executor v. United States. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). so the relevance of celebrating In re Neagle is unclear.
12. In addition. the authors laud President Wilson for vetoing legislation that
sought to vest in congressional committees a continuing say over executive policymaking
(p. 256). They do not connect how opposition to congressional meddling can be equated
to preservation of the unitary executive ideal. See alsop. 155 (addressing Pierce's opposition to a type of congressional veto): p. 282 (addressing FDR's vetoes of similar congressional efforts).
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presented in the book is thus overinclusive. confusing the reader
as to the scope of the authors· claims.
Moreover. the evidence addressed is underinclusive as well.
For while the material presented to demonstrate longstanding
executive views with respect to the removal authority is impressive. no comparable evidence is presented with respect to other
potential attributes of the unitary executive ideal. For instance.
the unitary executive principle should prompt presidents to centralize authority through executive orders (pp. 12-13) and
through efforts to reorganize the executive branch irrespective
of Congress's initial assignment of authority. The authors include mention of these attributes. 1' but do not treat them in the
same depth or with the same consistency as the removal authority.
The authors stress another possible attribute of the unitary
executive principle. namely that the president must have the
power not merely to supervise subordinates. but to supplant
their authority directly. They state that •·[ a ]ll subordinate nonlegislative and nonjudicial officials exercise executive power ...
only by implicit or explicit delegation from the president" (p. 4).
With that statement, they suggest that Congress plays only an attenuated role in designating the officer to exercise particular executive functions given that the president retains authority to
exercise all delegated authority directly. No matter what powers
Congress assigns to particular officeholders. the president can
make the final decision. Later. the authors repeat that there has
been a consistent view that the president exercises the "power to
nullify or veto subordinate executive officials' exercise of discretionary executive authority" (p. 14). Indeed. President George
W. Bush's administration recently advanced a similar view that
only presidents exercise the "executive .. power, and that therefore gresidents may nullify anything performed by a subordinate.

13. The authors address President Taft's reorganization efforts in some depth (p.
250). as well as those of President Wilson (p. 257). but do not analyze presidential views
towards reorganization across administrations. Interestingly. President Reagan's own
Office of Legal Counsel disclaimed that there had been any consistent presidential practice with respect to reorganizing the executive branch in the absence of authorization
from Congress: "This understanding has also generally been reflected in the Executive
Branch's acquiescence in the need for reorganization legislation in order to restructure or
consolidate agencies within the Executive Branch." Limitations on Presidential Power to
Create a New Executive Branch Entitr to Receive and Administer Funds Under Foreign
Aid Legislation. 9 OP. OFF. LEGAL COC:-iSEL 76. 78 (1985).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 27-51.
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As a matter of history, there is no longstanding agreement
among presidents as to a '"nullification" power. The book itself
provides scant evidence of any presidential power to nullify acts
of subordinates. 15 The authors elide concepts of control and nullification, persuasively arguing only as to the former. Thus, although the depth and breadth of the evidence they marshal to
support a robust presidential removal power are impressive,
their further argument as to historical grounding for a nullification power is wholly unpersuasive.
Moreover, the authors overlook a corollary to their unitary
executive conception: given that subordinates speak in the president's name, presidents should stand accountable for subordinates' actions. The closer the control claimed by a president over
subordinates-as reflected most clearly in the authors' nullification thesis-the more a president should stand accountable for
all actions within the executive branch. In litigation against the
federal government, however. presidents have argued that the
executive branch is comprised of independent governmental entities, and that each must be sued before relief can be accorded.
Presidents thereby have reinforced the notion that executive
branch agencies possess distinct legal personalities, undermining
the authors' thesis of a consistent presidential assertion of a
power to supplant the decisionmaking of subordinates. The authors-and to my knowledge, nearly all other commentatorshave overlooked that questions concerning the unitary executive
have surfaced in routine litigation initiated by private parties
against the federal government. In short, although Professors
Calabresi and Yoo's book is wonderfully informative about presidential views concerning the unitary executive as a control mechanism, it slights the salience of the same theory in litigation
against the federal government. At the end, examining these related contexts should not render the authors' historical examination superfluous, but it does suggest that the presidential practice
outside of the removal authority context has not been as uniform
as the authors suggest.
In Part I, I review the book, and highlight the authors' stress
on the importance of the removal power to understand the unitary executive ideal. The authors present a cornucopia of exam15. For normative defenses of a nullification power. indeed from one of the authors. see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson. The Unitary Execwive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Texfllalist Response to Justice Scalia. 107 COLL'C\1. L.
REV. 1002 (2007): Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash. The President's Power to
Execllle the Laws.104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
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pies to demonstrate how presidents have viewed the removal
power as sacrosanct. The very accumulation of the historical materials discussed strongly supports their view of the centrality of
the appointment and removal powers in providing presidents
with unitary control over the executive branch.
In Part IL however, I suggest that the authors' more limited
focus on a presidential power to nullify acts of subordinates is
misguided. Some administrations, most notably that of George
W. Bush, have asserted that the Constitution vests presidents
with plenary control over all authority delegated to the executive
branch. To President Bush and others, a unitary presidency demands not only the power to hire and fire, but also the prerogative to exercise personally all authority delegated by Congress.
Irrespective of one's normative reaction to such an assertion6
and I have critiqued it in the pase - the authors' excellent history on the removal power is not repeated here. They simply have
not made the historical case for any such nullification power.
Finally. in Part III, I sketch in a more tentative fashion the
previously unexplored implications of the unitary executive in
the litigation context-when the executive branch is defending
itself in litigation against suit filed by private entities and individuals. Presidents in a wide variety of cases have not hesitated
to rely on a fragmented executive branch to dismiss claims. They
have argued that cases should be dismissed because the wrong
federal governmental entity was named and due to the fact that
insufficient governmental entities were before the court to permit effective redress. They have recognized that federal agencies
have distinct legal personalities. The litigation stances do not
comport with the authors· insistence on a consistent executive
belief in the ability to supplant agency determinations. The historical evidence, in other words, provides a more cabined understanding of the unitary executive than the authors and President
Bush's administration would have us believe.

16.
(2008).

Harold J. Krent. From a Unirary to a Unilateral Presidency. 88 B.U. L. REV. 523
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REMOVAL AND
APPOINTMENT AUTHORITY
A. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE IDEAL

The idea of a unitary executive is neither new nor radical.
The Framers rejected several proposals to split the executive.
and there have been adherents of a strong centralized executive
ever since. 17 The language of Article II seemingly embraces some
form of unitary executive by vesting "the executive power" in a
president; assigning the president the responsibility to "take care
that the laws be faithfully executed;" directing the president to
appoint all principal officers of the United States, and empowering the president to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments upon any
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices. " 1x
To most commentators, arguments for greater centralized
control based on the unitary executive ideal have coalesced
around two virtues: accountability and effective leadership. The
constitutional structure stresses accountability in order to secure
individual liberty. Articles L II, and III delineate powers that the
branches are to exercise so as to clarify the lines of constitutional
authority. The president stands responsible for all discharge of
policy, and is judged by his or her performance on election day.
To be sure, voters cannot always call the president to account for
one particular issue given that they vote for a candidate based
upon that candidate's entire record. Nor may the president be
able to stand for reelection. Nonetheless, the political process
remains open to air misgivings about presidential leadership and,
as those concerns mount in importance, they may become determinative at election time if not for the president, then for his
party. As the authors put it, the question of control "is not a liberal or a conservative issue, but rather one of good government''
(p. 7). Indeed, Alexander Hamilton noted in the Federalist Papers that:
it often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations,
to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a
pernicious measure ... ought really to fall .... The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that
where there are a number of actors who may have had
17.
IX.

SeeKRENT.supranote7.at 12-16.

U.S. CONST. Art. II.§ 2.
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diffe~ent

degrees and kind of agency ... it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil
which may have been incurred is truly chargeable. ~
1

Liberty is gained to the extent that one electorally accountable
official stands responsible for such law implementation efforts.
With a plural executive. responsibility may be shrouded, and the
costs of determining who was responsible for what increase.
B. EXECUTIVE PRACTICE
To demonstrate the historical importance of this governing
principle, the authors trace each president's views and actions
reflecting on the unitary executive theory. They focus on anumber of administrations in particular during which controversy
over the president"s removal authority arose. Throughout our
history. presidents zealously have safeguarded the power to appoint and remove federal officials, despite pressure from Congress. The following is a sampling drawn from the book.
President Washington's administration was criticaL for the
first debates over the removal authority arose shortly after he assumed office. The authors argue that Congress's ultimate decision to vest in the president the removal authority over newly
minted federal governmental positions demonstrates the importance placed on such centralized control. The so-called Decision
of 1789 has been widely studied in the past. under which Congress provided that the president be able to remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of Treasury from office
at will (pp. 35-36). The authors assert that the congressional decision to vest a plenary removal authority in the president reflected a constitutional view as opposed to a policy preference.
The fact that the debate was closely contested with respect to the
Secretary of the Treasury has suggested to others that Congress
was far from convinced that the Constitution mandated that the
president be empowered to remove executive officials at will.
The authors. however. focus rather on the fact that President
Washington exercised the same control over the Treasury Secretary as he did over the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and that he
did not hesitate to remove a number of executive branch officials
with whom he was not pleased (pp. 44-45). The authors subsequently endeavor to show that the president exercised supervi-

19.
1961).

THE FEDERALIST No. 70. at 428 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed ..
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sory control over criminal law enforcement of federal laws (pp.
47-52). The fact that private relators. grand juries. and state
prosecutors played a far greater role than today does not undermine their thesis.'" but does raise questions as to how close
the control over law enforcement in fact was.
The authors also argue that the Washington administration
exercised close control. or at least could have. over the executive
commissions created during his tenure in office. The authors
point out that the apparent independence of the Patent Office
and a federal commission to inspect the mint did not cut to the
contrary and that the president for all intents and purposes retained significant control (pp. 52-53). Only the structure of the
Bank of the United States gives the authors pause. and that
structure, they argue. may have stemmed from a view. since repudiated. that monetary policy was separate from governmental
policy (pp. 53-54).
The authors also focus on President Jackson's administration, both for his assertive leadership and for his claims of expansive executive power. In terms of the removal authority.
Jackson was not shy in dismissing officeholders upon assuming
the reins of power (p. 100). Moreover. President Jackson demonstrated a personal interest in law enforcement. ordering termination of condemnation proceedings against the jewels owned
by the Princess of Orange (p. 103).
In the battle over the Second Bank of the United States.
President Jackson's views of the scope of the unitary executive
became more manifest. He ordered Secretary of State Duane to
remove deposits held in the Bank but Duane. who had been an
ally, refused (p. 108). Jackson dismissed Duane. the deposits
were removed. and the Senate counteracted with a censure.
Jackson then responded that, because Article II made him "responsible for the entire action of the executive department. it
was but reasonable that the power of appointing, overseeing,
and controlling those who execute the laws-a power in its nature executive-should remain in his hands" (p. 111). He continued that "it is a necessary consequence that he should have a
right to employ agents of his own choice to aid him in the per20. The authors argue that the president. as a theoretical matter. could have ordered private relators or state law enforcement officials to drop or alter a prosecution.
Even if true. which is by no means clear. it remains incontrovertible that the president
lacked control over the initimion of law enforcement. See Harold J. Krent. Executive
Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from Historv. 38 A\1. U. L. REV.
.
275 (1989).
.
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formance of his duties. and to discharge them when he is no
longer willing to be responsible for their acts" (pp. 111-12). The
House. too. debated the issue. but President Jackson stood his
ground (p. 117). and ultimately prevailed. Jackson relied on the
removal authority to unify execution of the law.
Challenges of the Civil War and Reconstruction bring to
light Presidents Lincoln and Johnson's convictions that strong
centralized control was indispensable to effective presidential
governance. President Lincoln's decisive acts during the Civil
War manifested a strong unitarian conception of the presidency.
Indeed. any other view during that tumultuous period may have
stvmied his efforts to combat the crisis.
As noted before, however. the authors relate a number of
measures that cannot be ascribed to any unitarian conception of
the executive branch. For instance. they relate that, at the outset
of the war. President Lincoln mobilized troops and supplies
without congressional authorization (p. 166), ordered a naval
blockade of southern ports, and unilaterally suspended the writ
of habeas corpus (pp. 166-67). Many of his actions left Congress
scrambling to keep up.
With respect to supervision of the executive branch. Lincoln
removed his first Secretary of War, Simon Cameron. for insubordination in arming fugitive slaves for the Union Army (p.
171 ). He also removed from office almost the entire group of
presidential appointees who held office under his predecessor.
Although President Lincoln justly is remembered for his unilateralism and energy in responding to secession. the authors stress
that he also understood the critical importance of the removal
power in coordinating the executive branch.
President Andrew Johnson pursued his own views of Reconstruction unilaterally, but without Lincoln's skill. President
Johnson refused to implement the congressional design to punish leaders of the secession, protect the newly freed slaves, and
integrate the South back into the Union on Congress's terms.
Although impeachment efforts might have resulted from his continued efforts to thwart Reconstruction (pp. 176-78), the first
impeachment of a president in our nation's history stemmed instead from a deep conflict between Congress and the President
over the removal authority.
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Congress passed the Tenure of Office Act' to provide that
all civil officers appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate would hold office until their successors were confirmed by
the Senate. Cabinet members were treated slightly differently
and made subject to the president's removal authority but only if
the Senate consented. President Johnson vetoed the bilL arguing
in his message "'[t]hat the power of removal is constitutionally
vested in the President of the United States is a principle which
has been not more distinctly declared by judicial authority and
judicial commentators than it has been uniformly practiced upon
by the legislative and executive departments of the government"
(p. 180). He defended the removal authority not only upon historical grounds but also on the separation of powers structure in
the Constitution: the executive branch must be "capable ... of
executing the laws and, within the sphere of executive action, of
preserving, protecting. and defending the Constitution of the
United States" (p. 181 ). Congress overrode the veto.
President Johnson subsequently attempted to remove from
office War Secretary Edwin Stanton, a holdover from the Lincoln administration who remained on good terms with the radicals in Congress. Initially, Johnson complied with the Act and
submitted the reasons for the removal to the Senate, although he
accompanied the message with a call for repeal of the Act on the
grounds of its unconstitutionality: ''The President is the responsible head of the Administration, and when the opinions of a
head of Department are irreconcilably opposed to those of the
President in grave matters of policy and administration there is
but one result which can solve the difficulty, and that is a severance of the official relation'' (p. 182). The Senate refused to approve Stanton's ouster.
President Johnson a month later ordered that Stanton leave
office. Stanton refused, precipitating the constitutional challenge. The Senate passed a resolution condemning the ouster as
a violation of the Act, and Johnson responded that "[t]he uniform practice from the beginning of the Government, as established by every President who has exercised the office, and the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have settled
the question in favor of the power of the President to remove all
officers excepting a class holding appointments of a judicial character" (p. 185).

21. Act of Mar. 2. 1867. ch. 154. 14 Stat. 430. Congress repealed the Act in 1887.
Act of March 3. 1887. ch. 353.24 Stat. 500.

500

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 25:489

The House thereupon commenced impeachment proceedings. the primary charge consisting of the violation of the Tenure
of Office offense. The House overwhelmingly voted to impeach
the President. The Senate ultimately failed by a single vote to
convict on impeachment articles related to the removal of Stanton. Thus, although the impeachment reflects a congressional determination that Congress enjoyed the power to limit the president's removal authority, President Johnson's steadfast refusal
to cave in followed a long line of presidents who viewed the removal authority as a key determinant of presidential power.
President Franklin Roosevelt assumed great centralized
power. both to combat the threat within caused by the Depression. and the threat of German domination from without. Upon
entering office he issued an executive order transferring all legal
authority to the Justice Department, and he shifted the Bureau
of the Budget from the Treasury to the Executive Office of the
President (p. 280). FDR as would his successors, utilized the executive order as a means of asserting tighter control over subordinates on a wide variety of issues.
FDR also jealously guarded his removal power. objecting
when Congress attempted to force him to remove subordinates
because of their allegedly radical views (p. 283). Moreover, FDR
dismissed the Chairman of the FfC, William Humphrey, because of his right wing views (pp. 283-84). That dismissal
prompted a lawsuit. and the FDR Justice Department argued to
the Supreme Court that the restrictions in the FfC Act constitute "a substantial interference with the constitutional duty of
the President to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed."'
The brief further argued that the type of duties exercised by the
FfC in no way undermined the need for executive branch control through the removal authority (pp. 283-84). In its decision in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States.'' the Supreme Court embraced a limitation on dismissals for all executive officials exercising quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions, thus protecting the independence of certain agencies from direct presidential
control. Congress reacted by inserting for the first time limitations on removal in a number of statutes (p. 287).
Moreover. FDR sought to reorganize the executive branch
substantially. convening what was to be called later the Brownlow Commission to enhance the effectiveness of presidential
leadership. The Commission recommended that the independent
22.

295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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agencies be integrated into executive departments so as to prevent their centripetal pull. Indeed. if the agencies proliferated.
the Commission warned that the president"s ··stature is bound to
diminish. He will no longer in reality be the Executive. but only
one of many executives, threading his way around obstacles
which he has no power to overcome" (p. 293). The Commission
also recommended centralizing budget authority further, and
vesting in the president continuing authority to reorganize the
executive branch as conditions changed. FDR embraced the
Commission's recommendations. but Congress resisted, and ultimately handed FDR a stinging setback.
Upon reviewing the first fifty years after the launch of the
modern independent administrative agencies. the authors conclude that presidents consistently asserted the constitutional prerogative to rein in that independence. Both through efforts to
reorganize the executive branch and through deployment of the
removal authority, presidents acted congruent with the unitary
executive ideal.
With respect to our most recent president. the authors note
President George W. Bush's assertion of the right to fire any
official with whom he disagreed in the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (p. 408). In the face of serious allegations about wrongdoing within his administration. Bush appointed not an independent special prosecutor but a United
States Attorney (Patrick Fitzgerald) to investigate whether executive branch officials had illegally disclosed the identity of a
CIA operative, Valerie Plame (p. 410). President Bush expanded
the regulatory review program and, in so doing, directed that
regulatory review officers within each agency re1;ort not to the
agency head but to the president himself (p. 413).The focus on the administrations above. however, should
not obscure that the authors evaluate each presidency with reference to the executive's power to remove subordinates. All
viewed the removal authority as critical to the effective exercise
of executive power. Even the creation of administrative agencies
and the civil service system did not erode presidential assertions
of a robust removal authority. both before and after the Humphrey's Execlltor decision.

23. See Exec. Order No. 13.422. 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. U( 2007). President Obama
has since reversed that Order. See Exec. Order No. 13.497. 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30.
2009).
•
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Indeed, the authors take pains to track presidential reactions to the independent agencies. They write that Presidents
McKinley, Roosevelt, Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge all believed that they controlled the independent agencies and in fact
at times directed their actions, as might be expected before the
Humphrey's Executor precedent (e.g., pp. 234-35, 242, 257-59,
265-66). Presidents Roosevelt and Harding proposed consolidating independent agencies into new executive departments (pp.
241, 262), and it was President Wilson's discharge of postmaster
first class Frank Myers that ultimately led to the Supreme
Court's broad defense of the president's removal authority in
Myers v. United States,'~ a case which was briefed under the supervision of President Coolidge.
Frustration with the expansion of independent agencies
continued after Humphrey's Executor during the administrations
of every successive president. Presidents from Truman to Johnson railed against the notion that the independent agencies were
outside the executive's orbit, and the first President Bush threatened at the end of his administration to remove all nine members of the independent Postal Service Board of Governors for
failing to comply with a directive to abandon a position maintained in a postal rate fight (p. 389). 25 (The courts came to the
rescue of the Service and protected the Governors' tenure in office.'") And, it was President Clinton who first imposed formal
regulatory oversight over the independent agencies, requiring
them to share proposed rules with the Office of Management
and Budget prior to final issuance (pp. 393-95). In many respects, therefore, presidents even after Humphrey's Executor
and Morrison v. Olson have attempted to limit the ambit of independent agencies so as to preserve greater authority for the
unitary executive.
Based on this wealth of information, the authors conclude
that presidents historically have believed that they could remove
from office all executive branch officials, whether "independent"
or not, for reasons of policy. They do not clarify further whether
such removals can be reviewed by judges to ensure that the removals stem from policy differences, as opposed to reasons of
spite or bias, and there are few relevant presidential announcements on that score. Nonetheless, the authors make a strong case
24. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
25. The courts rebuffed President Bush's effort. enjoining removal of the Governors. See Mail Order Ass"n of Am. v. U.S. Postal Serv .. 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
26. KRE'\T. supra note 7. at 67~8.
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that, without the removal authority, presidents cannot attain
centralized control of executive branch implementation of the
law.
II. ADDITIONAL CLAIMS OF THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE
Although the book is styled as a history of the unitary executive, the authors rigorously analyze only the removal authority. The unitary executive ideal should also include, at a minimum, efforts to reorganize the executive branch and to funnel
delegated authority through the White House, such as through
executive orders. The authors note the development of executive
orders and efforts to reorganize the executive branch, but do not
trace each president's actions with respect to these attributes.
The authors assert an additional presidential prerogative
that they claim has been consistently adhered to by presidents.
They argue that presidents should be able to nullify any act by a
subordinate with which they disagree. In other words, presidents
cannot only remove officers with whom they disagree, they can
directly supplant their authority and change their decisions. Although they do not flesh out their theory, they apparently are of
the view that congressional delegations of authority to particular
officeholders are only provisional- the president can personally
exercise that power if he so chooses, and perhaps even reassign
that power to someone else. Without the power to nullify acts of
executive officials, presidents could not be fully accountable for
executive branch administration of the law.
The authors relate some incidents in which presidents countermanded the orders of subordinates. For instance, they report
that Presidents Grant and Cleveland overruled decisions by their
secretaries of the interior, but do not amplify (pp. 192-93, 210).D
They also recount an incident in which President Jefferson's efforts to direct a customs collector to take a particular action
were rebuffed by a reviewing court, much to President Jefferson's displeasure (pp. 73-74). Attorney General Caleb Cushing
during the Pierce administration voiced support for a nullification power (p. 155). The first President Bush issued a number of
signing statements protesting Congress's decision to impose ob-

27. See also p. 147 (recounting that President Tavlor"s administration asserted the
power to direct accounting officials).
·
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ligations on agents of the executive branch without permitting
his supervision (p. 386).
Yet, those few instances are contradicted by others that the
authors cover. For instance, they relate that the comptroller exercised final decisionmaking authority over certain disbursements in President Washington's administration (p. 57). They recount that Attorneys General William Wirt, Roger Taney, and
1ohn Young Mason all argued that the president lacked the
power to correct "the errors of judgment of incompetent or unfaithful subordinates" (pp. 142-43). The authors state, as well,
that the Fillmore administration asserted that the president
lacked authority to direct accounting officers in their settlement
of accounts (p. 151). They also note that presidents such as Truman specifically disclaimed the power to direct their subordinates' actions (p. 310).
More tellingly. they omit any discussion of presidential
views as to whether presidents enjoy the power to direct agency
heads to reach particular positions in rulemakings or adjudications. The authors are clear that presidents should be able to discharge agency heads for policy differences, presumably whether
in fashioning rules or adjudicating cases. That position is controversial in itself. 2' But the authors fail to document historically or
justify normatively the further position that presidents should be
able to nullify or supplant agency head determinations when issuing rules or adjudicating disputes.
Indeed, with relatively minor exceptions, the nullification
theory only flowered with the administration of George W.
Bush. President George W. Bush's signing statements and other
initiatives portray a unitary executive that would permit the
president to countermand a subordinate's decision. In President
Bush's view. Congress evidently cannot delegate authority to a
subordinate executive branch official without formally allowing
the president to substitute his own views for those of the officer.
In a sense. the identity of the delegate chosen by Congress would
become largely irrelevant. Congress might as well choose to deleg~te to the Secretary of Labor as opposed to the Secretary of
Defense: they are just stand-ins for the president himself.
28. See. e.g .. A. Michael Froomkin. The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments. 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 13..\6 (199..\): Robert V. Percival. Presidential Management of the Administrati•·e State: The Not-so-Unitar\' Exewti•·e. 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001): Peter Shane. Conl'etllionalism in Constitwional In-terpretation and the Place of Administrative Agencies. 36
A~t. U. L. REV. 573 (1987): Charles Tiefer. The Constitwionality of Independent Officers
as Checks on Anuses of Exec wive Power. 63 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1983).
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In the signing statements, President Bush objected to a
number of congressional directives that delegate "final" authority to a subordinate official. Although President Bush did not expound on his views, he seemingly determined that Congress,
consistent with the theory of a unitary executive, can delegate
such final authority only to the president.
For instance, Congress in a 2002 DOJ Appropriations Authorization Act delegated '"final authority" to a subordinate of
the Attorney General over certain prosecutorial training grants
abroad.~ President Bush responded that such delegation had to
be construed "in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authorities to supervise the unitary executive and to
30
conduct the Nation's foreign affairs." President Bush believed
that vesting final authority in a subordinate officer risked undermining his own ability to administer the law. In the same Act,
Congress vested in United States Attorneys, in the context of
particular civil settlements, "the exclusive authority to select an
annuity broker from the list of such brokers established by the
Attorney General. " 31 President Bush wrote that "the executive
branch shall construe the section in a manner consistent with the
President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch."'~ In this most routine or even trivial of administrative settings, the statement asserts that Congress cannot vest
"exclusive" authority in any executive branch official other than
the president- officials subordinate to the president do not enjoy independent legal status.
President Bush's objections to legislation directing that he
act through a specific officer reinforces that view of a highly centralized unitary executive. For instance, in crafting an emergency
preparedness plan, Congress provided that:
9

If the President, acting through the Secretary of Health and

Human Services, determines that 1 or more substances of
concern are being, or have been released in an area declared
to be a disaster area ... the President, acting through the Secretary of Health and Human Services, may carry out a program for the coordination, assessment, monitoring, and study

29. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act. Pub. L. No. 107-273.
2002.2004. 116 Stat. 1758. 1789·1790.
30. Statement on Signing the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations
Act. 2 PCB. PAPERS 2010.2011 (Nov. 2. 2002).
31. ~ 11015(b ). 116 Stat. at 1824.
32. Statement of Nov. 2. 2002. supra note 30.
§~
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of the health and safety of individuals with high exposure le33
vels .... "

To President Bush, the congressional direction that the president
was to act through a specified individual, even though a cabinetlevel official subject to his plenary removal authority, violated
the unitary executive. He stated that: "The executive branch
shall construe Section 709 of the Act, which purports to direct
the President to perform the President's duties 'acting through' a
particular officer, in a manner consistent with the constitutional
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive
branch."'~ Moreover, in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
of 2003, President Bush asserted the unconstitutionality of the
provision that "[t]he President, acting through the Director
General of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service of
the Department of Commerce, is authorized to establish Technology American Centers. '' 35 Even though President Bush exerted supervisory authority over the Director General, the congressional specification, in President Bush's view, sapped
presidential authority. As with the earlier set of statements,
Congress may not purport to permit an agency official to bind
the president: presidents must be permitted the opportunity to
change subordinates' determinations.
The scope of President Bush's theory of the unitary executive also is illustrated in his many signing statements asserting
the unconstitutionality of requiring agency heads to recommend
to Congress proposals for legislative revisions. In objecting to
over one hu_ndr~d provisions reauirin~ agency official~ to recommend legislatiOn to Congress, President Bush seemmgly has
embraced the view that Congress cannot compel presidential
subordinates to make recommendations to Congress.
For instance, in signing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 37 President Bush objected to a numbers of provisions which
33.

Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 109-347.

§ 709(b )(I). 120 Stat. 1884. 1948.

34. Statement on Signing the SAFE Port Act. 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1817
(Oct. 13. 2006).
35. Foreign Relations Authorization Act. Fiscal Year 2003. Pub. L. No. 107-228.
§ 645. 116 Stat. 1350. 1403 (2002).
36. Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner. Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power. 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (2006) (arguing. however. that President Bush's
signing statements did not stake out new ground).
37. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat.
2064.
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purport to require an executive branch official to submit recommendations to the Congress. The executive branch should
construe such provisions in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch. Moreover, to the extent such provisions of the
Act would require submission of legislative recommendations,
they would impermissibly impinge upon the President's constitutional authority to submit only those legislative recommendations that he judges to be necessary and expedient. Accordingly, the executive branch shall construe such provisions
as requiring submission of legislative recommendations only
3
where the President judges them necessary and expedient. x

Section 110(c)(4) requires the head of the Coast Guard to
"make[] a recommendation with respect to whether the program, or any procedure, system or technology should be incorporated in a nationwide system for preclearance of imports of
waterborne goods. " 39 Section 112( 4) similarly requires a recommendation "for legislative or other actions needed to improve
security of United States ports a~ainst potential threats posed by
flag vessels of [certain] nations." ' Congress did not bar presidential review of the proposed safety measures. Yet, to President
Bush, these legislative provisions undermined the unitary executive, apparently by intruding into the president's constitutional
prerogative to be the sole executive branch official to make all
recommendations to Congress.
For another example, in the De}i'artment of Justice Appropriations Act discussed previously, Congress directed the
Attorney General to "submit a report and a recommendation ...
whether there should be established, within the Department of
Justice, a separate office of the Inspector General for the Federal Bureau of Investigation." 42 Again, Congress did not bar the
Attorney General from conferring with the President before the
recommendations were made, yet President Bush objected. 43
Even officers of the United States had no role under the Bush
conception to make proposals for legislative change. In the same
Act, Congress required the Office of Personnel Management to
"submit a report to Congress assessing the effectiveness of ex38.

Statement on Signing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. 2 PUB.

PAPERS 2132 (Nov. 25. 2002).

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

§ 110(c)(4). 116 Stat. at 2092.
§ 112(4). 116 Stat. at 2093.

See supra note 29.
§ 309(c).116 Stat. at 1784.
Statement of Nov. 2. 2002. supra note 30.
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tended assignment incentive authority as a human resources
management tool and making recommendations for any changes
necessary to improve the effectiveness of the incentive authority. ,.w To President Bush, that directive crossed constitutional
lines because it "purport[ ed] to require executive branch officials
to submit to the Congress plans for internal executive branch activities or recommendations relating to legislation.,., The mandatory nature of the provision clashed with his understanding of
the unitary executive ideal. Therefore, he continued, "[ t ]he executive branch should construe such provisions in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise
the unitary executive and recommend for the consideration of
the Congress such measures as the President judges necessary
and expedient. " 46 All recommendations to Congress apparently
must be funneled through the Office of the President.
7
As relayed by the authors: President Bush also changed
the reporting relationship within each agency so that regulatory
policy officers would report not to the agency head but to the
president directly. President Bush evidently believed that he
could brush aside the reporting relationship established by Congress. Indeed, a Congressional Research Service Report asserted
that:
[W]ith the submission of the President's FY2003 budget. the
Bush Administration appears to be attempting to transfer
programs from agencies through funding consolidations. For
example, the programs and $234.5 million budget of the Office of Domestic Preparedness, Department of Justice, would
be transferred to the Federal Emergency Management Agency .... [T]he propriety of moving program responsibilities and
related funds without statutory authority appears to be highly
.
bl e. -IX
questwna

President Bush apparently claimed the authority to rearrange
both funding and responsibilities among executive branch agencies.
~~-

~5.

§ 207(d). 116 Stat. at 1780.

Statement of Nov. 2. 2002. supra note 30.
/d.
See supra text accompanying note 23.
HAROLD C. RELYEA. EXECUTIVE BRA;o.;CH REORGANIZATION AND
MA;o.;AGEMENT INITIATIVES 8 (CRS June 12. 2002). In addition. President Bush an·
nounced in earlv 2008 that he intended to transfer the functions of the Office of Gov·
ernment Inform-ation Services from the National Archives to the Department of Justice.
See White House Plan to Put New FOIA Office in Justice Department Draws Lawmakers'
Ire. 76 U.S.L.W. 2441 (Jan. 29. 2008).
~6.
~7.
~8.

2009)

BOOK REVIEWS

509

President Bush's Administration, however. did not consistently assert a presidential power to supplant the decisions of
subordinates. Consider an Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, not discussed in the book, which explored whether the president could centralize border control policy to a greater extent
than Congress had authorized:
Congress may prescribe that a particular executive function may be performed only by a designated official
within the Executive Branch, and not by the President.
The executive power confers upon the President the authority to supervise and control that official in the performance of those duties, but the President is not4 constitutionally entitled to perform those tasks himself. y
The Opinion flatly contradicts the nullification thesis forwarded
by the authors.
Furthermore, President Bush never claimed the power to
substitute his views for those of an agency head in formal rulemaking or adjudication under the Administrative Procedure
Act. 5° Congressional directives that particular officers exercise
administrative power are routine. The Secretary of Health and
Human Services, for instance, issues rules and adjudicates cases
that bind the executive branch. In common parlance, these rules,
decisions, and orders are "final." The president can remove the
Secretary from office if he disagrees with the rules promulgated
or the cases adjudicated. If presidents could exercise final authority over rulemaking or adjudication. the very premise of onthe-record administration action would be compromised. To my
knowledge, not one president has opposed the Administrative
Procedure Act as a derogation of his authority.
My point here is not to engage the authors as to whether, as
a normative matter, presidents should be able to supplant the
decisions of subordinates, 51 but rather to highlight how little historical support exists for such a conception. The book's careful
assessment of longstanding presidential support for a robust removal authority does not extend to other potential attributes of
a unitary executive theory, including the power to nullify acts of
subordinates. The authors fail to present evidence of continuous
49. Centralizing Border Control Policy Under the Supen·ision of the Attorner General, 26 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL. slip op. 2 (2002).
50. 5 u.s.c. §§ 500-596 (1966).
51. For criticism of their theory. see Peter L. Strauss. Overseer, or "the Decider"?:
The President in Administrative Law. 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007): Percival. mpra
note 28.
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presidential opposition to congressional determinations to vest
particular responsibilities in particular agency officials. Congress
long has viewed agency heads as distinct legal personalities.
III. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AS A SHIELD
In this last section, I investigate, as a preliminary matter, the
possible salience of litigation against the federal government to
the unitary executive theory. Litigation provides an illustrative
context with which to assess the depth of presidents' commitment to the unitary executive ideal in general and, in particular,
to the nullification version espoused by the authors. One can
discern presidential views towards executive power as much
through stances in litigation as through removals, signing statements, and executive orders. Although litigation patterns among
presidents are not uniform, presidential administrations, in a
wide variety of contexts, have asserted defenses in litigation that
compromise the unity of the executive branch. They have acknowledged the separate legal personalities of executive branch
entities. arguing that the wrong government agency was named
or that additional agencies needed to be named before relief
could be granted. Presidents have not assumed responsibility for
acts of subordinates. My goal is not to examine the probity of
such defenses but rather to point out how problematic these litigation stances are when examining the authors' sweeping claims
for consistent presidential assertions of the nullification version
of the unitary executive. No president, to my knowledge, has ever significantly eased the path of adverse litigants for the sake of
burnishing the image of a unitary executive in the public's eye.
A. INTRABRANCH LAWSUITS
In many litigations. the executive branch itself has not
treated the federal government as one indivisible entity. One
such instance has been remarked upon before-presidential administrations have permitted, if not encouraged, one agency to
52
sue another in seeking judicial resolution of a dispute. Such
lawsuits undercut the conception of a unitary executive under
which each official's decision represents that of the president. A
brief inquiry into intrabranch lawsuits serves as an introduction

52. See general/v Michael Herz. United States v. United States: When Can the Federal
Government Sue Itself'. 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893 (1991).
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to presidential positions in relatively routine litigation that reflect upon the unitary executive ideal.
Consider the Federal Labor Relations Authority, which
Congress created in 1978 to resolve disputes between agencies
and their unionized employees." The FLRA can rule against
agencies, and it subsequently can petition the appellate court to
enforce an order. So far, six presidents have served since passage
of the FLRA, and none, to my knowledge, has protested that only he can resolve such intrabranch disputes. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has resolved a number of disputes between the FLRA and
54
another executive branch agency. If the president can supplant
the decisionmaking of all executive branch subordinates, how
can lawsuits be permitted to proceed without making a mockery
of the nullification version of the unitary executive that the authors advance?
The FLRA cases, as well as those involving the Merit Systems Protection Board," perhaps can be rationalized on the
ground that one federal agency stands in the shoes of government employees and thus its position with respect to the employing agencies is sufficiently adverse to permit suit. The reasoning
may be persuasive as a matter of standing doctrine, but does not
explain why presidents permit agencies to sue one another if
they can nullify the decisions of subordinates. At a minimum,
presidents have acquiesced in congressional schemes that pit one
agency against the other.
The history of intrabranch disputes extends more broadly.
Most famously, President Nixon engaged the courts to contest a
subpoena issued by the special prosecutor."' In cases of lesser notoriety, executive branch agencies have initiated suit against
each other. For instance, prior to United States v. Nixon, the
United States sued the ICC when it disagreed with its railroad
7
rate determinations/ and it later sued the FCC in a dispute over
telephone rates.'" Moreover, the executive branch has sued to
53. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-454. 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
54. See. e.g.. NASA v. FLRA. 527 U.S. 229 (1999): Dep·t of Defense v. FLRA. 510
U.S. 487 (1994): Dep"t of Treasury v. FLRA. 494 U.S. 922 (1990).
55. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory. 534 U.S. 1 (2001 ): Lachance v. Erickson. 522 U.S.
262 (1998).
56. United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 6S3 (1974).
57. United States v. ICC. 337 U.S. 426 (1949): see also Ford Motor Co. v. ICC. 714
F.2d 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Department of Defense challenged the ICCs refusal to
award reparations for overcharges).
58. United States v. FCC. 707 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 19S3).
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contest _mergers and rate agreements that one of its agencies approved.w More recently, two federal agencies overseeing personnel matters lined up on opposing sides in litigation over qualifications critical for the corps of administrative law judges.""
Perhaps some of the litigation can be understood as a nod to
the reality that, under prevailing doctrine, presidents cannot in
fact control independent agencies but must use whatever means,
including litigation, to ensure control." 1 Yet, by permitting its
own agencies to sue others within the executive branch, presidents have perpetuated the idea of a divided executive branch.
In any event, some litigation has been launched between
executive branch agencies that are not considered "independent." The Secretary of Agriculture, for instance, sued the EPA
for suspending the registration of pesticides."2
Presidents have, at times, endeavored to keep intrabranch
lawsuits out of the courts, instructing agencies to bring any disputes to the Attorney General for resolution."' Moreover, they
have defended against suit by independent agencies on the
ground that intrabranch disputes are not consistent with the uni64
tary executive. But, the fact that presidents have permitted and
even launched litigation against agencies presupposes separate
legal personalities of agencies and undermines the authors' thesis that presidents have acted consistently with the nullification
65
power.
The authors might retort that, until the president chooses to
nullify a subordinate's acts, the subordinate maintains legal independence. They could continue that, although agencies can
sue each other, the president has the means to halt such litiga59. United States v. Marine Bancorp .. 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (challenge to merger that
had been approved by Comptroller of the Currency): United States v. Fed. Mar.
Comm·n. 694 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 19R2) (challenge to agency approval of rate-fixing
agreement). For a more complete discussion. see Herz. mpra note 52.
60. Meeker v. MSPB. 319 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (pitting OPM against MSPB ).
61. Even then. the Solicitor General represents most independent agencies in court.
at least at the Supreme Court level. Neal Devins. Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor
General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation. 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994).
62. Envtl. Def. Fund. Inc. v. EPA. 54R F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
63. Herz. supra note 52. Executil·e Order No. 12,146. 3 C.F.R. 409 (1979). Even
then. the Order does not prohibit resort to courts. but rather only imposes a preliminary
hurdle.
64. For relatively recent examples. see Tenn. Valley Auth. v. EPA. 278 F.3d 11R4
(11th Cir. 2002): Dean v. Herrington. 668 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (exercising jurisdiction over the TV A's contract claims against the DOE).
65. Intrabranch litigation is an affront to the theory that presidents can supplant the
determinations of subordinates. Such cases conflict as well with the superintendence
theory. but not as sharply.
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tion. Yet, in the public eye. intrabranch litigation undercuts the
notion of any nullification power and, in any event. the book is
bereft of examples in which ;residents attempted to halt intrabranch litigation in its tracks.
B. STANDING AND REDRESSABILITY
In addition to presidential acquiescence in the intrabranch
litigation, presidents proactively have asserted the independent
legal personalities of agencies as a shield to protect the executive
branch from lawsuits filed by private entities. They have argued
that, if plaintiffs cannot show that their injury is redressable by
the particular governmental entity sued, then their case should
be dismissed. They have refused to be accountable for injuries
suffered due to the combined actions of subordinate governmental agencies.
The Supreme Court first elaborated on the redressability
7
component of standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife." The
case arose out of a challenge to governmental aid for hydroelectric projects in Egypt that allegedly harmed the environment.
Plaintiffs challenged the Department of Interior's decision under
the Endangered Species Act,hl' which limited the duty of federal
agencies to consult with the Secretary over federally funded
projects affecting endangered species. Under the regulation,
federal agencies must consult with the Secretary over projects in
the United States or on the high seas. but not over projects overseas supported by the agencies. such as one for the Aswan Dam
in Egypt.
For the Court, Justice Scalia held that plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate redressability: "instead of attacking the separate
decisions to fund particular projects allegedly causing them
harm. [plaintiffs] chose to challenge a more generalized level of
9
Government action (rules regarding consultation)."" By that. he
meant that "[s]ince the agencies funding the projects were not
parties to the case, the District Court could accord relief only
7
against the Secretary. " " The executive branch itself had argued
against standing. reasoning that courts should not view the executive branch as one '"generalized" entity, but rather composed
66. The prominent exception is President George H.W. Bush's efforts in the postal
service dispute. See supra text accompanying note 25.
67. 504 u.s. 555 (1992).
68. 16 u.s.c. § 1536 (1988).
69. Lujan. 504 U.S. at 568.
70. !d.

514

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 25:489

of component parts. In its reply brief, the government stressed
that "only the Secretary [of the Interior] is a party," and "an injunctive order must sgecify the federal officers who are respon1
sible for compliance." The case was not redressable because the
absent agencies would not necessarily change their conduct. 72
Plaintiffs' claims were unsuccessful in part due to the executive
branch's refusal to take responsibility for actions within its control.:.'
The executive branch argued to similar effect in Bennett v.
74
Spear. There. ranchers and water irrigation districts challenged
a biological opinion issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
analyzing the effects of a planned Bureau of Reclamation
project on two species of endangered fish. Under the regulatory
scheme. agencies such as the Bureau must determine whether to
abide by the biological opinions of the Service, a separate agency. before proceeding with planned projects. Accordingly, the
executive branch argued that the suit should be dismissed because any injury suffered by plaintiffs could not be redressable
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, but rather only by the
agency that in fact proceeded on the project, the Bureau of Rec75
lamation, which was not before the Court. As the executive
branch argued in opposing certiorari, "Because petitioners' alleged injury results from the 'independent action of some third
party not before the court,' they have failed to satisfy the consti76
tutional requirements for standing. "
To the executive branch. it was immaterial that both agency
heads were subject to close presidential control and presumably
reflected the president's views. Rather, the government argued
that no standing existed in the case because all agencies had to
be subject to the jurisdiction of the court before relief could be
accorded the plaintiff. The agencies had separate legal personalities. Although the government was not successful in urging this
71. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 16 n.6. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 504 U.S.
555 (1992) (No. 90-1424). 1990 U.S. Briefs 1424.
72. See also Wilderness Soc'v v. Norton. 434 F.3d 584 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding
non-redressable Wilderness Society's action to compel the National Park Service to seek
the President to recommend creation of additional wilderness areas).
73. lronicallv. Justice Scalia's redressability holding in Lujan undercuts the very
unitarv executive ·ideal that he previously embraced in cases such as Morrison v. Olson.
487 c:s. 654.698 (1988) (Scalia. 1.. dissenting).
74. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
75. Brief for the Respondents at 15-20. Bennett v. Spear. 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (No.
95-813). 1996 WL 396714.
76. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 6. Bennett. 520 U.S. 154 (No. 95-813).
1996 WL 33413297 (citations omitted).

BOOK REVIEWS

2009]

515

77

particular argument, its reasoning is telling: in litigation, the executive branch has disclaimed at least one version of the unitary
executive theory for, if all agencies are subject to the immediate
control of the president-and, indeed, are mere stand-ins for the
president himself- then plaintiffs could have received redress.
C. FAILURE TO NAME PROPER EXECUTIVE BRANCH PARTY
Indeed, in settings far more mundane than the standing cases, the executive branch has supported distinctions drawn by
Congress as to which agency is a proper defendant by urging that
suits be dismissed or resubmitted when the wrong agency is on
the caption, or when the wrong governmental official has been
named. For example, in Williams v. Army and Air Force Exchange Service7x plaintiff had filed an employment discrimination
claim arising out of her job as department supervisor for the
Army and Air Force Exchange Service. As the court of appeals
described, "instead of suing the Secretary of Defense or the head
7
of AAFES, [she] named AAFES as the sole defendant."' y Counsel followed that up by mailing a summons and copy of the complaint to the AAFES. the U.S. Attorney General, and the U.S.
Attorney for the relevant district. Despite the notice, the executive branch moved to dismiss the case on the ground that plaintiff had named the wrong governmental entity, and the court
agreed.>«> The executive branch did not avail itself of the opportunity to demonstrate its unitariness by accepting responsibility
for actions of subordinates and defending suit on the merits.
Many comparable cases exist.x 1
Similarly, the government has often moved to dismiss cases
for lack of venue, arguing that the congressional differentiation
with respect to which official is the proper respondent be strictly
followed. To illustrate with but one example, consider the controversial case involving Jose Padilla, who was apprehended on
77. The Court rejected the executive branch's argument in this respect. finding a
close enough connection between the biological opinion and the ultimate relief sought by
plaintiffs.
78. 830 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1987).
79. /d. at 28.
80. !d. at 29.
81. See. e.g., State Bank of Coloma v. Nat'l Flood Ins. Program. 851 F.2d 817 (6th
Cir. 1988) (dismissing suit because plaintiffs had sued subordinate part of Federal Emergency Management Agency instead of the Director of the agency itself): Calderon v. U.S.
Dep't of Agric .. Food & Nutrition Serv .. 756 F. Supp. 181 (D.N.J. 1990) (dismissing case
for failure to name United States as defendant as opposed to FNS): Rhys v. U.S. Postal
Serv .. 702 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mass. !989) (dismissing case for failure to name Postmaster
General as defendant).
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suspicion of Al Qaeda links and then designated by President
Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld as an enemy combatant.x"
The Defense Department held Padilla in a brig off of South
Carolina, and denied him the right to counsel. Through an attorney acting as next friend, Padilla filed a petition for habeas corpus, contesting the continued incarceration and violation of his
right to counsel.
The government responded in part by arguing that the case
should be dismissed for failure to bring the action in the proper
jurisdiction. Although Padilla had named as respondents the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and the commander of the
brig in which he was housed in South Carolina, the government
argued that only the commander as the immediate custodian
could be named as a respondent in a habeas corpus case. Because the case was not filed in South Carolina, the government
argued that the case should have been dismissed. There have
been numerous cases dismissing habeas corpus actions when the
wrong party, such as the Attorney General, has been named in83
stead of the warder or jailer, and individuals contesting loss of
parole must sue the prison warden, not the Board of Parole.>;.t Petitioner, however, argued that the Secretary of Defense exercised de facto control over him because of the enemy combatant
designation so that venue would have been appropriate in New
York where. arguably. the Secretary of Defense could have been
sued. The lower courts agreed.x'
On certiorari to the Supreme Court. the government's brief
explicitly relied on Congress' differentiation of functions: "The
habeas statutes dictate, in the context of core habeas challenges
to present, physical confinement, that the proceedings take place
in the federal district of confinement ... against his immediate,
on-site custodian rather than a supervisory official located in
another, potentially far-removed district. ,so The supervisor could
not serve in the stead of a subordinate. despite the fact that the
subordinate followed the supervisor's dictates. The Supreme
Court agreed with the executive branch and ordered the habeas
82. Rumsfeld V. Padilla. 542 u.S. 426 (2004).
83. See. e.g.. Sanders v. Bennett. 148 F.2d 19. 20 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (holding that the
warden and not the Attorney General is the appropriate respondent in a habeas case):
Monk v. Sec·v of the Navy. 793 F.2d 364.369 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same).
84. Billiteri v. U.S. Bd. of Parole. 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976).
85. Padilla ex. rei. Newman v. Bush. 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002): Padilla v.
Rumsfeld. 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
86. Brief for the Petitioner at 16. Rumsfeld v. Padilla. 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 031027). 2003 U.S. Briefs 1027.

2009)

BOOK REVIEWS

517

petition to be dismissed."' holding that Rumsfeld was not an appropriate respondent even though he had ordered that Padilla
be treated as an enemy combatant and exercised continuing '"legal control" over petitioner. Presidents have rarely, to my knowledge, rejected the refuge of congressional venue provisions to
permit suit against a federal official, even though suit would
have been appropriate against another official over whom the
court had jurisdiction.
Congress's specification of the role to be played by specific
executive branch actors has weight, and presidents have urged
courts to dismiss suits when the congressional specifications have
not been adhered to, even though a different federal actorwhether subordinate or supervisor-may have caused the injury.
Presidents have missed an opportunity to assert the unitariness
of the executive branch.
D. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN AGENCY OFFICIALS AND THE
PRESIDENTS THEY SERVE

Moreover, the executive branch has defended against suit
on the ground that agency determinations do not reflect presidential input. Congress in a variety of contexts has set presidents
to review agency decisions, thus suggesting a difference between
agency and presidential determinations. Presidents have acquiesced in the distinction.
Consider the Supreme Court's decision in Dalton v. Specter."" There, a number of plaintiffs sued in part to overturn the
Secretary of Defense's recommendation to the president to close
a particular military base. Under the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act,"9 the Secretary was to propose closure of bases
based on congressionally set criteria to an independent commission appointed by the president. The commission then held public hearings and was to submit its report to the president.
The Court held, accepting the executive branch's arguments, that the commission's report was not "final agency action" under the Administrative Procedure Act,'J( 1 in that the president need not comply with any recommendation by the
commission. In other words. agency determinations were not
viewed as actions of the president, but as the determinations of a
87.
88.
R9.
90.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla. 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
511 U.S.462(1994).
10 U.S.C. § 26R7 (19RR).
5 u.s.c. § 704 (1966).
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distinct legal personality. Accordingly, because the president
could not be sued directly under the AP A, the Court rejected
the suit. Similarly, in Franklin v. Massachusetts 91 the executive
branch successfully urged no review on the ground that census
decisions of the Secretary of Commerce could not be imputed to
92
the president. The executive branch did not consider the Secretary's decision to reflect the views of the president.
To be sure, one could argue that the congressional scheme
itself is consistent with the unitary executive because it vests ultimate decisionmaking in the president. But, in so doing, Congress has legislated a distinction between agency and president.
and the executive branch has stood behind Congress's differentiation in defending against the suit. A nullification theory presupposes the potential for presidential intervention ex ante, not
ex post. If subordinates in the executive branch can '·exercise executive power ... only by implicit or explicit delegation from the
president." as the authors suggest (p. 4), then congressional efforts to distinguish between the decisions of the president and a
subordinate would be invalid. Every "final" decision of a subordinate would in effect be that of the president. Yet, in litigation,
presidents seemingly have furthered the notion that presidents
and agencies have distinct legal personalities. By acquiescing to
congressional structures that set presidents apart from the agency officials they control, the executive branch arguably has undermined the authors' claim that presidents consistently have asserted a conception of the unitary executive that permits no
salient distinction between presidents and the agencies they supervise.93
91. 505U.S.788(1992).
92. To similar effect. see also Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp .. 333 U.S.
103 (1948) (denying review because Civil Aeronautics Board certification of airline
routes had yet to be approved by the president).
93. Consider. as well. the sovereign act doctrine. which the executive branch has
embraced to excuse contract performance by executive entities. In one of the first cases
to articulate the doctrine. Horowitz v. United States. 267 U.S. 458 (1925). the Supreme
Court examined the question of whether an agency's decision to embargo the shipment
of silk was a sovereign act that precluded a different agency's prior contractual pledge to
ship silk that the government had sold to a private entity. The Court held that
"[w]hatever acts the government may do. be they legislative or executive. so long as they
be public and general. cannot be deemed specially to alter. modify. obstruct or violate
the particular contracts into which it enters with private persons." /d. at 461. The two
characters of government- ··contractor" and "sovereign" -could not be "fused." /d. Accordingly. one agency's policy decision could excuse another entity's breach without necessitating payment of damages.
. .
Similarlv. in Derecktor v. United States. 128 F. Supp. 136 (Ct. Cl. 1954). plamllff had
contracted ~ith the Maritime Commission. a federal agency. to purchase a ship with the
understanding that it could be transferred to a foreign registry. The State Department
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Finally, there are a number of cases in which the executive
branch has argued, and the courts have agreed, including in Dalton and Franklin, that there is no judicial review of presidential
as opposed to agency officials' acts. However, if an agency official acts only at the explicit delegation of the president, why
should there be a difference as to reviewability? Presidents
should stand accountable for the acts of their agency heads and
permit review to the same extent as presidential determinations
since all executive branch decisions stem from the same fount of
power. Yet presidents have never complained that Congress has
subjected agencies, but not themselves, to AP A requirements
and the potential for judicial review. Indeed, they have asserted
in litigation that agency officials as opposed to the chief executive should be subject to suit."~ In so doing, presidents have further separated their own office from those of the agencies they
control.
A cursory examination of litigation involving the executive
branch reveals, therefore, that presidents in defending against
litigation have taken positions that suggest a stratified executive
branch. Agencies have sued other agencies in court; the absence
of all agencies before a court needed to provide relief makes a
case nonjusticiable; naming the wrong executive branch agency

later intervened to prevent the transfer on the ground that it might be used to smuggle
Jewish refugees to Palestine. Plaintiff sued for damages caused by the breach of contractual terms. but the court rejected the claim. reasoning that the State Department's embargo constituted a "sovereign act." excusing the Maritime Commission from contractual
liability. As Judge Whitaker retorted in dissent: "This is a case in which this court gives
sanction to bureaucratic action in violation of a right. this time a right acquired in consideration of the payment of a large sum of money to the defendant itself. who asserts the
power to keep the money and to deny the right for which the money was paid." /d. at
142. He continued further that "[n]o sovereign has the power to induce the payment of
money to it in consideration of a promise and then not keep the promise. or pay for the
damages suffered for its failure to do so." /d. at 144. See also Conner Bros. Constr. Co. v.
Geren. 550 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that military commander's order shutting
down base was a sovereign act excusing delay by Corps of Engineers before allowing
construction project to proceed).
In a sense. the sovereign act doctrine can be understood more as a gloss on sovereign immunity than the unitary executive. The key issue. after all. is the nature of the
governmental action. and it is immaterial whether the sovereign act stemmed from Congress or a different governmental agency. Nonetheless. the doctrine reveals an instance in
which the executive has gone out its way to disclaim full unitariness: one agency's promise can be breached by another's policy priority. To the litigant. the executive branch has
refused to stand as one undivided entitv.
94. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 731 (1982). for instance. the executive branch
argued successfully that. although whistleblowers could bring claims directly against
agencies for retaliation. they could not sue the president. Moreover. in cases such as Mississippi v. Johnson. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866). they have argued that federal courts can
enjoin agency officials but not the presidents who order them to take particular positions.
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is grounds for dismissal, and agency head decisions are not
deemed to be those of the president. Taken together, these positions strongly indicate that presidents have staked out claims inconsistent with the nullification version of the unitary executive
advocated by the authors, and thus undermine the authors' thesis that there has been a consistent executive practice in this respect.
CONCLUSION
Steven Calabresi and Christopher Y oo have performed a
great service by exploring every president's exercise of the removal power. They relay the circumstances leading up to the
removals, relate relevant presidential pronouncements, and depict the controversies that from time to time arose.
As a historical work gauging the extent to which each president's practice conformed with the unitary ideal, however, the
book warrants only an incomplete. The book is both over and
underinclusive in presenting examples during the respective
presidential administrations. Moreover, the book's assertion of a
nullification power is not even borne out by the examples that
the authors themselves provide, and finds only limited support
elsewhere. Had the authors examined the positions staked out in
litigation by the executive branch, they would have been even
more hard pressed to point to a nullification power in particular,
for presidents widely have accepted and indeed furthered a conviction that executive agencies have distinct legal personalities.
Thus. although the book's focus on the pivotal role of the removal authority throughout our history is exemplary, a more
complete historical analysis of the unitary executive remains to
be written.

